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LAw AND

DEVELOPMENT: RECONFIGURING OUR

CONCEPTIONS OF ETHICS, POLITICS AND THE LAW
-Dr. Nigam Nuggehalli

INTRODUCTION

When we discuss law and development in India, we inevirably discuss this
subjecr wirh a sense offoreboding. Even, as scholars who make their livelihood
discussing legal complexities, we despair ar where a discussion on law and
development in India would lead us. Ir is now rrire armchair philosophy to
say rhar the rule of law is a non-srarter in India and, therefore, any serious
discussion on polirics and governance reforms in India is nor only woollyheaded, bur downrighr misleading, as ir gives a misraken impression rhar
rhe law can deliberarely bring abour changes in Indian society. Surely, rhese
reacrions are rhemselves exaggerared, bur there is a reason why cliches are
popular: they contain a grain of trurh. It is rime perhaps to radically rethink
the most fundamental shibboleths of our moral and political principles. That
we embark on a different parh is no guarantee rhat rhis parh will be any better
rhan the one nor raken , and my views in this essay are really only meant as a
preliminaty explorarion of what, hopefully, will turn out to be a fruitful inquiry.
The central concern of rhis paper is to introduce rhe idea of an inspirarional
communiry, a communiry rhat consists of leaders and members who are
inspired by each other to live better lives. There are rhree carchphrases here
rhar are meaningless without further explanation: community, leaders and
inspiration. The reader would have noticed rhar the three phrases appear to
relare to ethical and political behavior and, therefore, go beyond a narrow focus
on the law. I believe, we miss important insights unless we look ar law and
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development through the prism of ethics and politics.I The ideas of community
and inspiration refer to what would be termed as ethical and moral phi losophy
in the current lexicon. The related idea of leadership involves mainly ideas in
political philosophy.
A development initiative, as understood in this essay, is the deliberate intervention
by the state into the economic and social life of its residents in order to fulfill
certain goals, at least some of which relate to the disadvantag d sections of the
society. Law is usually the medium - though not the sole medium - of such an
intervention , as one can see in the legislation relating to land reforms or food
security or employment. This essay presents two conceptions of the role oflaw
as a medium of political intervention. I begin by describing two conceptions
of the good life, which influence our view on the role of the law as a medium
for development. I , then, focus on the role that ethics and community play in
these two co nceptions of the good life. I , then, turn to the law and explore how
the two conceptions of the good life lead to two competing conceptions of the
law as either an enabler, or a restrainer. Finally, I analyze the recent debate on
Gram Nyayalayas in the light of my previous analysis.

CONCEPTIONS OF THE GOOD liFE
Inspiration and Duty
The two conceptions of the law described below depend in tu rn on twO
conceptions of ethics, or what makes a human life a good life. I will call the first
conception the 'life of inspiration' and the second, the 'life of .uty.' I will spend
more time explaining the life of inspiration, as the life of duty is a conception
that is more familiar to us. The life of inspiration is meant to commend an
individual who inspires other people. To begin with , the 'life of inspiration' is
a slightly misleading term as it gives the impression of a pied iper leading his
people to glory. The problem with this impression is that it sguises both the
This is not a novel daim. Influential philosophers like Joseph Raz and Ronald Dworkin
have wrinen about ideas that trespass over ethics, morality and the law. See, for examp le,
JOSEPH RAz, TH E MORAUTY OF FREEDOM(1986) or RONALD DwORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE
(1986).
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effect of the inspiration, i.e., what exactly happens when one person inspires
another, as well as the question of how this inspiration is actually achieved.
The effect of the inspiration is that the individuals who are inspired add to rheir
understanding of a value. So, one might say rhat Peter inspired Tom to understand
better the value offriendship, or one might say Peter inspired Tom to understand
friendship better. This, rhen, is rhe effect of inspiration, which is rhat a person's
understanding of a certain value is imptoved. But, here again rhe explanation is
slightly incomplete. A person's understanding of a certain value is improved only
rhrough some action of his. Therefore, Tom in rhe example above understood
better rhe value offriendship only because of, and rhrough, some actions of his.
For example, Tom was inspired by Peter to do somerhing for his friends rhat
showed Tom's understanding of rhe value of friendship had improved.
Moving now to the inspirer, a person improves the inspired's understanding
of value in much the same way as described above: rhrough actions . In rhe
example above, it was Peter's actions that inspired Tom's actions. Peter's actions
were actions that demonstrated his understanding of rhe value of friendship.
These actions inspired Tom's actions that demonstrated, in rum, that Tom's
understanding of the value of friendship had improved. For example, Peter was
generous to his friend John during a time when John was hard up for money.
Peter's actions of generosity demonstrated rhat Peter had a certain understanding
of the value, and Peter's actions in turn inspired Tom's actions of generosity.
A person's understanding of a value can be added to in broadly twO different
ways: in a fundamental way and in a non-fundamental way. The understanding
of a value is improved in a fundamental way when every aspect of rhat value
is illuminated. For example, when a busy person helps a blind man across rhe
street during the morning rush hour, it might illuminate all aspects of the value
of kindness for persons who are witness to such an act. An understanding of a
value is increased in a non-fundamental way when some aspect of that value,
hitherto not understood by a person, is illuminated. For example, when a
person gives up his seat on the train for a pregnant lady, it might illuminate
some aspect of the value of kindness to persons who are witness to such an act.
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What is the d ifference between Tom acting generously and Tom acting
generously because his actions of generosity are inspired by Peter's actions of
generosity? In the area of inspiration, there is no knock-down argument of
causality that can establish the difference. Consequently, disagreements about
whether one person has inspired another person would be inevitable and in
many cases irresolvable.
The life of inspiration is not about individual acts of inspi ation. T he good
life refers to a life of a person who tends to inspire other people. Therefore, this
theory of the good life focuses on the personaliry of the individual- whether he
is the kind of person who inspires other people. Individual acts of inspiration
add up ro a life that tends to inspire other people, but, once agai n, there is no
conclusive argument as to how many acts of inspiration are needed to come
to the conclusion that a person tends to inspire other people.
Until now, I have written about the 'inspirer' and the 'inspired' without
writing about the relationship between the two. The twO share a relationship
of inspiration in that each is fondamentally inspired by the other. There is a
reciprocal relationship between the two; each is both the inspi red and the
inspirer vis-a-vis each other. I will have more to say about this later, but suffice
it to note here that this reciprocal relationship makes the inspirer and the
inspired part of the same community.
To summarize the discussion above, according to one conception of the good
life, a good life consists in a member of a communi ty, through h is actions,
tending to inspire the other members of his comm uniry to commit actions
that demonstrate that they share his understanding of a certain value, whether
that value relates to professional values, family values or values in other fields
such as sports. When an individual shares his own understanding of a value
with another individual, he adds to that other individual's understanding of
that val ue.

An addition to an understanding of a value requires that a certain understanding
of a value is instantiated (i.e., is demonstrated) in a person's actions followed
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by another person (or persons) acting in such a way that demonstrates his
understanding of the value has been improved because of the instantiation of
the value. The improvement in the latter person's understanding of the value
is demonstrated by the person 'keeping faith' with the instantiated actions of
the first person. For example, if the people in the kind person's community
referred to above engage in activities of generosity and philanthropy after
being inspired by the kind person, they have kept faith with the kind person's
actions . However, the elements of understanding and faith that are implicit
in the discussion here are not normative in nature and, therefore, impervious
to a prescriptive analysis. One can describe the instantiation of the value of
kindness or courtesy in a person's activities and also describe how another
person has been inspired or has kept faith with the first person's understanding
of courtesy or kindness, but one does not analyze these in terms of 'oughts' ; it is
meaningless to say that there is a way in which a value ought to be instantiated
or that one ought to keep faith with an instantiated va lue in a certain way.
A corollary to this is that accountability does not have a meaningful role in the
'life as inspiration' conception. If a person does not inspire the members of his
co mmunity, the consequences are not abour accountability. Such failures do
not call for an accounting. A person leads a good life or fails to do so; he is not
punished or made accountable for his failure to inspire.
The life ofinspirarion has two characteristics. First, the life of inspiration focuses
on the personality of the individual whose life is under consideration. A person
who leads a life ofinspirarion is the kind of person who tends to impire the right
actions (i.e. , actions that show a greater understanding of a value) in others
persons in a particular situation. Second, an individual is able to inspire because
he is part of a community of people who inspire each other. I had alluded to
this earlier when I wtote that the idea of inspiration only makes sense between
members of a community. The sub-chapter on ethics and community will go
into the idea of community in more detail.
According to the conception of the good life as a life of duty, a good life mainly
consists in fulfilling one's duties towards the members of one's communities
(or one's responsibilities to oneself) to the fullest extent possible. According
203
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to the life of duty, ethical success means a person fulfils certain duries owed to
other individuals (or certain responsibilities owed to himself), be it members
of his family, colleagues at work, neighbors or fellow members of a community
organization. A dutiful person's success in fulfilling certain dur ies depends on what
that particular duty would require. For example, the duty f parenting would
require that a child be nurtured in health and education in her formative years.
The standards applicable to a person's conduct in this conception of the good life
are vety different ftom those that would be applicable in the 'life as inspiration'
conception. The 'life of duty' seeks standards that can be articulated beforehand
to some degree of precision, for there is no point in analyzing what a person is
obligated to do (as opposed to how a person tends to succeed In inspiring others),
unless the standards are capable of being articulated precisely at least to some
degree. This includes situations in which a person can be held subject to certain
restraints even though all aspects of those testraints are not yet clear. The life of
duty has complex standards, for the duties have to contend with the varied aspects
of h uman life. The idea is to attempt to meet one's duries, however complex they
might turn our to be. The life of duty lays great stress on accountability; the
whole point of owing duties is to be accountable when the time comes to fulfill
them. A violation of a duty is followed by certain kinds of consequences: either
the violator of the duty is required to express his regret to the victim in some
way, is required to pay compensation to the victim or is penalized or punished.
The life of duty considers the community as part of the circumstances that gives
rise to duties. In this respect, what the rest of the members of one's society do
are a series of facts that sets the stage for the imposition of duries on persons.
For example, the concentration of economic and social power in politicians is
a set of facts that, along with other sets of facts (unequal disrribution of wealth
in the population) will result in certain duties imposed on politicians.

ETHICS AND COMMUNITY
How does the community figure in our ethical lives? How are we kind fathers,
inspiring sportspersons, visionaty leaders and savvy businessmen by virtue
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of being part of a certain community such that it makes sense to say 'I am
successful because the community in which 1 live makes me successful'? There
is a fundamental difference between two approaches to what makes our lives
successful as a result of the community of which one is a member, and this
depends on our view of ethical success.
Those who consider ethical success as a life of inspiration are likely to perceive
the community as an enabler. According to this perspective, for individuals
to do better in their lives (i.e., inspire), they need to be part of a community.
A community is a group of persons where the persons' membership of the
community is based on whether a member is fonda mentally inspired by the
actions of the other members of the community.' Such an inspiration (i.e., an
improvement in one's understanding of a value) can be implicit rather than
explicit (for example, instead of advocating courtesy explicitly, by using 'thank
you' and 'please' in the same way as the others in the community are using
such courtesies) , bur it is because of such a commitment that a person becomes
eligible to inspire other members of his community.
However, one must remember what was pointed out earlier: the elements of
understanding, inspiration and faith that are implicit in the enabling function
of the community are not normative in nature and, therefore, impervious to
a prescriptive ('ought to') analysis. One can describe the instantiation of the
value of philanthropy in our social practices and also describe how a person
has been inspired by, or has kept faith with, the instantiation of the value of
philanthropy, but one is not prescriptive in formulating either the instantiation
or the way in which one can keep faith with the instantiation.
One might ask what purpose a study of a community serves if there is no
prescription in the analysis of either the value that is instantiated in the
community, or in the manner in which a person can keep faith with the
instantiation of value within the community. The point of the written work
is, in fact, complementary to the role of the community, i.e., it is part of the
2

This commitment can take the form of following the directions of the leader of the
co mmun icy as long as the leader is generally followed
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process of enabling good lives. Good scholarly writing is meant to do what the
community, which is the subject of the writing, does: inspire people to keep
faith with the instantiations of value in the community.
On the other side of the debate on ethics, some see the community as ptoviding
opportunities for fulfilling one's duties towards others (o r fulfilling one's
responsibilities). In this story, social practices or customs are not enablers of
inspirational activities; rather these practices result in certain duties that people
owe each other. Persons can either succeed or fail in meeting these duties
that they owe one another. The question of keeping faith with a communal
instantiation of value is simply not relevant here; the issue i~ whether a person
was able to meet the requirements that Row ftom duties that people owe one
another or responsibilities that people owe themselves.
Those who consider the community as providing opportunities for fulfilling
one's duties towards another are likely ro consider the community (or practices
within the community) as a set of restraining practices. Duties have the logical
character of restraint; i.e., when one owes a duty to another, a necessary part
of the description of the duty is that the person is restrained in his actions to
a certain extent. A community consists of restraining ptactices in the sense
that, given the existence of these practices, people are under certain restraints
in their relations with one another.

IS LAW AN ENABLER OR A RESTRAINER?
Given our understanding of the role of social practices, we can now turn to
poli tics which we can perceive as a kind of social practice where there is a
deliberate effort to sustain, depending on one's perspective:, the enabling or
restraining role of the community. For the enablers, politics refets to how a
person or a group of people within the society intentionally attempt to make
sure the enabling function is performed well. This means that the politicians
act as a proxy for the role performed by the communiry; instead of the
community members inspiring other community members towards a greater
unders tanding of value, it is the politician or the group of politicians who
inspire their community members through their actions.
206
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For the restrainers, politics refers to how the prescriptive or normative features
of community restraints can be sustained. As I have discussed how, for the
restrainers, the presence of community practices results in certain duties or
restraints on the members of the community. Politics is the study of what a
gtoUp of people within the community (i.e., the politicians) can do to sustain
prescriptive or normative features of the community restraints on its members.
Restrainers ask the following question: why should we restrain ourselves with
respect to each other's life and ptoperty (i.e., subject ourselves to duties regarding
the protection of human life and property)? The answer might be that such
restraints would continue to have normative force only if there is some attempt
on the part of the members of the society to be just with each other. Therefore,
for many restrainers, a study of politics is a study of justice, of how society
should, for example, equitably distribute resources and opportunities.
Law is a social practice that attempts to make, depending on one's perspective,
the enabling or restraining function of politics more systematic. A systematic
approach in the political function means making the political function (either
restraining or enabling) more resilient and predictable. The law, therefore, has
the function of ensuring that the political function succeeds more often than
not. Depending on one's view on the community's role, the law improves the
enabling or the restraining function of political practices.
This debate between enablers and restrainers is, therefore, relevant to the debate
about the nature of the law. If we take the enabler's perspective, the law is a
formalized and systematic political intervention beginning with legislation,
continuing through adjudication and ending with actions by the executive. This
intervention is meant to fundamentally inspire the citizens in some manner;
the most direct way is to ask them to act in a certain way (as many legislative
provisions do), much like a village leader will exhort people to take an action.
For example, the legislature might enact a statute that states the following:
'Anyone guilty of intentionally possessing cocaine would be sentenced to a
minimum number of two years.' In form, this is no different from an identical
proclamation of a community leader. The state's exhortations are backed by
coercion, but this is because certain activities, when made non-optional, are
207
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more likely to inspire certain actions {such as avoidance of drugs}. But. the
state does not only exhort. it also inspires by example. and this is what the
judges do when they give their judgments and state officials do when they
execute state policy.'
For example. the common law develops in the form of each judge making a
decision that other judges. as well as people subject to the law. take as examples
of actions intended to inspire {whether they do. in fact. inspire or not} . The same
considerations apply to state officials implementing state policy. For example.
when an immigration official applies the immigration statute to an asylum
applicant. his actions purport to serve as an inspiration to the community he
is meant to serve. whether they do in faCt inspire or not. 4
On the other hand. for the restrainers. there are two approaches to the role of
the law. Both sets of restrainers believe in systematically improving the ability
of the state to sustain the community's imposition of restraints on its members;
however. the two approaches differ in the manner in which such a systematic
improvement would occur. One set of restrainers believes that the law improves
the role of politics by guiding people towards the proper course of conduct
with each other that would best sustain the restraints that society imposes on
its members.' The other set of restrainers believe that the law improves the role
of politics in sustaining restrictive social practices when it ensures that any such
restriction is pursuant to a coherent set of principles applicab le to all the subjects
of the law. or in other words. law ensures that political practices have integrity6

3

I am writing about circumstances when political leaders do, in fact. inspire; I am nO[
suggesting that legislators and judges and state executives always. or even regularly, succeed
in inspiring the members of their communities.

4

If the imm igration office is corrupt and accepcs bribes in return for favors. it is obvious
that he is not acting in a manner that would inspire his community. But, uninspiring acts
can be uninspiring not only due to their vcnaJ icy; it could be the case that the immigration
officer is negligent or incompetent.

5
6

I refer mainly to the work of Joseph Raz and philosophers sympathetic to his point of
view. See. for example. JOSEPH RAz. THE AUTHORITY OF U W (I979) .
I refer mainly to the work of Ronald Dworkin and philosophers sympathetic co his point
of view. See. fo r example. RONALD DWORKIN. UWS EMPIRE (I 986).
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Therefore, the two sets of restrainers have different perspectives on the role
of the law. The former focuses on the authority of legal officials and the latter
on the integrity of legal officials. Either way, the law consists of standards
of conduct that are normative, bur the degree of prescriptivism depends on
one's perspective. The first set of restrainers believes that the law consists of
directives of a person or a group of persons. The implications of one person
or a group of persons issuing directions to others follow the logic of the law's
characterization as a finite set ofdiscrete directives. To take a typical example,
consider the case of a legislature issuing legislative directives and the court
implementing the legislation.
According to this set of restrainers, on some legal issues, a court is not constrained
by the language used by the legislature.' For example, if the legislature enacts
an excise tax on 'vegetables,' and a judge has to decide whether a tomato is a
vegetable, the judge is not bound any longer by the excise duty statute because
the stature is indeterminate in its application to the tomato. For example, Hart
believes that such uncertainties in the application of statutes arise out of the
'open texture' oflegallanguage, i.e., legal language cannot account for all the
situations in which a law needs to be applied '
For another set of restrainers, the law is much more prescriptive in that no
maner what the legal conttoversy, there is an applicable legal solution. This set
of restrainers is mainly concerned to refute the idea that all laws can be traced
to directives from a person or a group of persons. They argue that the first set
of restrainers would find it difficult ro explain the pervasive existence of 'legal
principles' that are difficult to reconcile with the enabler's point that all law is
derived from a directive or a set of directives issued by a political authority such
as a court or a legislature. Consider Dworkin's example of cases such as Riggs v.

7

See, Ronald Dworkin, Th, Motkl ofRultS 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967) 33 where he states
the following abom discretion : 'We usc "discretion" sometimes not merely (0 say that
an official must use judgment in applying the standards set him by authoriry, or that no
one will review that exercise of judgment, but [Q say that on some issues he is simply not
bound by standards set by the authority in question.'

8

HLA

HART, THE CONCEPT OF

LAw 126-127 (1997).
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Palmer and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors. 10 In Riggs, despite the existence
of a seemingly inflexible statutory rule on wills, a grandson who m urdered his
grandfather could nor inherit under the grandfather's will, because the court
applied the principle that a person ought not to benefit from his own fraud.
Similarly, in Henningren, the court considered various (sometimes competing)
principles relating to freedom of contract and a manufacturer's liabiliry for
faulry goods.
Where do these principles come from? The second set of restrainers argue
that these principles are part of the law even though there is no particular
authoritative directive to which these principles can be traced. Ronald Dworkin
argues that the origin of these as legal princi pies lies not in a particular decision
of some legislature or court, but in a 'sense of appropriateness developed in the
ptofession and the public over time.'''
The enablers differ from both strands of the restrainers' approach towards the
nature of the law, although the enablers share some of their arguments with
both strands of restrainers. Enablers agree with the first strand in so far as the
argument goes that statutory ptovisions or judicial pronouncements might
exhort people to do some act or restrain from doing some act. But, the enablers
do not believe that the law consists of such enactments. The enablers argue
that the law is a way in which an understanding of the values of politics is
shared berween people, including people who perform the legislative, judicial
and executive functions and the people who are at the receiving end of these
functions. The enablers agree with the second strand that legislative enactments
by themselves do nor make law, but they disagree with the second strand in
that enablers believe there is no obligatory or normative c ntent to the law.
The second strand of the restrainers believe that the judge is under a dury
ro apply the requirements of the law that best explains the past legislative
9
10
II

115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
32 N.J. 58, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Both Riggs and Henningsen art· discussed in Ronald
Dworkin, Th, Morkl ofRul", 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967) 23-75.
Id,at41.
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and judicial decisions taken in the community. On the other hand, the
enablers disclaim any existence of a duty on the part of the judge. The ideal
judge performs his function in such a way that he tends to communicate his
understanding of values (relevant to the community to which he belongs) to
the litigants, lawyers and his fellow judges. It would not be wrong to fail to
perform this function, but it would lead to the judge failing to better his life.

IMPUCATIONS OF THE NEW APPROACH
I will use a recent criticism of the Gram Nyayalayas Act 2008 as an opportunity
to discuss the implications of the new approach above. I' There are mainly
four criticisms of the Gram Nyayalayas. First, the adjudication process is not
sophisticated; 13 two, there are inadequate layers of appeals; 14 third, there are
no procedural safeguards to ensure fairness in the trial; 15 and finally, the close
involvement of the police in the Gram Panchayat means there would be a bias
towards the state. 16
The first criticism assumes legal reasoning is a complex rational activity. This
is a natural outcome of a theoty of the good life that bases itself on duties,
for duties are rationally analyzable and, when applied to real life situations,
can appear complicated. But, the first criticism has less force in the case of a
life of inspiration, where the values in question are not rationally analyzable.
When values are not rationally analyzable, the lack of legal sophistication in
the people manning the adjudicatoty ptocess becomes less important. Perhaps,
the people adjudicating may not have advanced law degrees or be experienced

12

13

Menaka Guruswamy and Aditya Singh. Acussing /njustiu, the Gram Nyayalayas Act
2008Eco. & POL. WEEKLY Vol. 4 5(43) (October 23, 2010) a! 16. (Hereafter. 'Accessing

Injustice') I am using this article as an example. There are many other valuable criticisms of
the Gram Nyayalayas legislation. See. for example, SudhirKrishnaswarny, Gram Nyayalayas
and the Hazards of Informal justice, December 5. 20 I O.
Id at1 7: 'These are social welfare legislations which require careful and sophisticated
adjudication .'

14

Idatl l -IB.

15

Idat l B.

16

Id.
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in interpreting complex legislation, but they might still be able to apply the
applicable legislation in a way that inspires the people subject to the legislation.
This might be because they understand the community better since they have
lived amongst the community for a longer time compared to the persons
manning the more formal judicial system.
The legislation might have interlocking ptovisions that not only need to be
read together, but also might have to be read along with the common law and
previous legislation in the relevant area. For example, each provision of the
food security legislation might have to be interpreted in the light of all the
other provisions of the legislation relating to supply and storage of food grains,
as well as the other legislation in the area related to ancillary administrative
matters and, further, the common law duties applicable to officials. This kind
of exercise, one might argue, ought not to be left in the hands of inexperienced
and untrained judges.
I believe that the argument outlined above can be generalized to state that
adjudication takes special skills and, therefore, must be confined to adjudication
specialists, much like travel planning takes special skills and must be left to travel
specialists. But, we don't always go to travel planners; many of liS prefer to make
our own plans despite the apparent complexity of our travel schedules. The
restrainers argue that a plethora oflaws has room only for specialist or expert
interpretation. This is not necessarily true. For example, complex legislation
might be capable of interpretation by non-lawyers because e disputes that
are being adjudicated concern mainly factual matters . It could even be the case
that people who are closely associated with the problems of a local com munity
are best placed to solve the legal problems arising in that comm unity, however
complex it might look on the surface.
The second criticism is about getting to the right decision in a particular
matter. This aspect of decision-making is once again a consequence of the
restrainers' view of the law. The enablers are less concerned with the number
of appeals and would be happy with a lower number as long a~ the right kinds
212
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of people are found to judge matters. The enablers do not believe in analyzing
decisions as right or wtong decisions; the decisions at the level of the Gram
Nyayalayas might turn out to be uninspiring, but that is a problem for the
person who gave the decisions. Recall that, for the enablers, the question of
accountability is not important; what is important is whether a person is
able to inspire others. The enablers might well come to the conclusion that
such an inspiration is best achieved through a single tier than a multiple
tier judicial system. If the focus shifts to the person making the decisions,
then naturally the idea of several layers of decision-making does not look as
compelling as before.
The third criticism regarding procedural safeguards arises once again from the
restrainers' insistence that there be a proper procedure for rationally arriving
at the right decision. This is very different from the enabler's perspective that
would like a judge to inspire the right decisions in the populace subject to their
decisions and in their fellow judges. The restrainers say the right decision must
be arrived at, whereas the enablers focus on the person making the decisions.
The enablers could be of the opinion that procedural safeguards are useful
only to the extent they are helpful in the judicial decision maker tending to
inspire other people in the community. If the procedural safeguards are such
that they create a distance between the judicial decision maker and the litigants
he engages with, the enablers might argue that they can be discarded in favor
of simplet judicial decision-making procedures.
The final criticism focuses on the biases in the system associated with
the close involvement of the police. This focus is another offshoot of the
restrainers' focus on duties. Restrainers try ro remove all the barriers ro an
individual making the right decision. On the other hand, enablers consider
some elements of governance as essential to ensuring that a person becomes
the sort of individual that tends to inspire others to perform their functions.
Enablers might well argue that it is essential that the judges and the police
work closely in order to ensure that they tend to inspire well the people
subject to their decisions.
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CONCLUSION
This essay considers twO approaches ro law and governance, one to do with
inspiration, and the other to do with duty and responsibility. The fo cus on
inspiration has two implications. First, whether a person leads a good life is
inextricably linked to the actions that the person inspires in other members
of that person's community. Second, accountability to others for one's actions
is nor in play here; what is important here is whether one has succeeded in
inspiring his community members . The life of inspiration can be contrasted
with the life of duty. A life of duty has two implicarions. First, it does not
matter whether one inspires other people in one's community; it is enough if
the relevant duty or responsibility is fulfilled by the person subject to the duty or
responsibility. Two, accountability is an important and inevitable consequence
of the breach of a duty.
What implications do the above conclusions have for gover ance structures?
The recommendations in terms of governance are to have a principlesbased legislative framework, struCtures that inspire activity that adds to the
understanding of value in the community and the identification of co mmitted
leaders. A good leader acts as a proxy for what social practices do, namely,
add to the community's understanding of values. A good leader does this
indi rectly, by laying down a framework for the development of virtue, or
more directly by serving as an example that inspires other people.
This approach has certain practical consequences. Our political endeavors ought
to be focused on building inspirational communities and not on accountability
in the way the restrainers perceive it. This way of looking at the relationship
between law, ethics and politics also has consequences for scholarly research and
writing on law and governance. Such research and writing must aim to inspire
people, much like social practices and leaders inspire people, and, therefore,
must be appealing, passionate and interesting.
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What kind or research and what kind of writing are we envisaging in this new
paradigm in law and development where there are new perspectives on ethical
success and on leadership? I will refer to this kind of writing as political writing
from now on. Political writing's similarity with the work of political leaders
is that both the political writer and the political leader aim at fundamentally
inspiring the members of their communities. The difference is that the political
writer tries to inspire thtough his writing, the politician tries to inspire through
systematic political and legal rools (legislating, judging, executive power).
(Legislation is not political writing as it is part of a coercive framework intended
to direct people to do something or to refrain from doing something.)
Political writing in the area of law and development should not only be
inspirational and passionate but also work within communities; the work of
political writers must be an integral part of the political work in their respective
communities. The best political writing is that writing which engages with issues
local ro the community and engages with community issues in a way that aims
to fundamenta lly inspire the members of a community.
The political writer must be part of the community which he addresses in his
writing. Therefore, he must be fundamentally inspired by the members of his
community for him ro fundamentally inspire the community in turn. A great
deal of academic writing in political philosophy, while useful and sometimes
interesting, is itself of the non-political kind, for one can't fundamentally
inspire people in a community unless one is part of the community, and one
can't be part of a community unless one's actions are fundamentally inspired
by the actions of the members of the community. One can't aspire to a
fundamental inspiration regarding the values relevant to Gram Nyayalayas,
for example, unless one is familiar with the working of the administrators of
Gram Nyayalayas.
Many academic writers in political philosophy have addressed their work to
an audience that consisted mostly of other political philosophers. The issues
discussed and the terminologies used have been so complicated that both
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politicians and the public have not been inclined to follow the discussion. I
believe, the work done by these political philosophers is important, but it is
not meant to fundamentally inspire politicians or the people who are affected
by political policies. Only politicians, their subjects and political writers can
fundamentally inspire one another, and political writers must facilitate this
inspiration by becoming part of the community about which they purport to
debate.
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